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Romania has proved to be an interesting case study of the limits of
autonomy within the Soviet bloc. Romania's foreign policy has become
increasingly independent of Soviet dictates over the last fifteen years,
while domestic controls have remained as rigid as any in Eastern Europe.
There have been a number of cases where the Romanians have indicated
in dramatic fashion their distance from Soviet foreign policy: their
refusal to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute; their recognition of West
Gennany in 1967; and their unwillingness to participate in Warsaw Pact
military exercises or the intervention in Czechoslovakia.
Less well known is Romania's unorthodox position on arms control
and disannament, particularly with respect to European security.
Romania has been East Europe's most outspoken critic of the anns race,
and assigns equal blame to the superpowers for their inability or
unwillingness to moderate this race. President Ceausescu and his
representatives have proposed numerous, detailed, and far reaching
plans for military disengagement and disannament in Europe. And
Romania has played an active and independent role in United Nations
and other multilateral anns control forums.
Romania's geostrategic position helps explain its anns control and
disannament policies. As a small state, concerned about maintaining its
sovereignty in the shadow of a great power, and fearful of the
possibility of a major war between the superpowers on European soil,
Romania has a major stake in anns control, especially on the European
continent. To reduce annaments, especially nuclear ones, would not only
minimize the likelihood and consequences of a European war, but would
provide greater equality for the smaller powers by reducing the military
prerogatives of the big ones.
Romania's policies on anns control may be viewed as a means by
which that country has tried to implement its own vision of a desirable
world order. This vision includes a greater role and autonomy for smaller
states in the international arena, a decreased use of force in relations
among states, a reduction in the importance of military blocs in
international politics, and a consequent reduction in the predominance
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of security issues in such relations.
Many of Romania's foreign policy activities may be seen as instru
ments to achieve these goals. These include increased diplomatic and
trade relations with Western and Third World states, increased participa
tion in international organizations and multilateral forums, and in
creased propaganda, diplomacy, and activity in arms control and
disarmament.
For Romania to achieve its goals would be to allow ita greater
measure of autonomy, and to reduce its dependence on the Soviet
Union. In some respects, Romania seems to be following Marshall
Singer's prescription for Weak States in a World oj Powers, where he
argues that 'power rests as much, or more, on the ability to attract as it
does on the ability to coerce.'l Romania's power of coercion vis a vis any
state is quite small, so it has utilized diplomacy and trade as a means of
'attracting' other states to it. Singer identifies the three components of
power as wealth, organization, and status. Again, in the absence of any
great advantages in the first two, Romania has concentrated on the latter
in its diplomatic activities, and witlI some degree of success. Singer
counsels tlIe weak states to diversify the powers upon which they depend,
and to expand 'the degree of political consultation and accommodation'
with other weak states 2 Romania has also done this, as will be seen
below. The result is that Romania does seem to have moved from
dependence on the Soviet Union toward interdependence, a much more
stable and beneficial relationship for both, in Singer's view.
Romania's World View
Romania has proposed a 'new world order' in which all states are
sovereign, independent, autonomous, and cooperative. Romania rejects
supranational institutions, and stresses the importance of the national
state, which 'has remained and will long remain an important motive
force of social and political growth, of progress on a domestic and world
scale.'J The concepts of sovereignty and autonomous development have
been important themes in Romanian foreign policy since the early 1960s,
when two issues were driving Romania apart from the Soviet Union.
The first dispute was over Khrushchev's plan to increa.se the
supranational functions of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) by calling for a 'socialist division of labor' in Eastern Europe,
which would have required Romania to emphasize light industry and
agricultural production. Romania rejected this formulation, and continued
with its own economic plans for rapid industrialization. The second issue
was the increasingly vitriolic Sino-Soviet dispute. Romania opposed the
open airing of these differences and tried to play a mediating role
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between the two states at a number of communist party conferences in
1959 and afterwards.
In 1964, the Romanian Party leadership went public with its own
criticism of the Soviets and their efforts to dominate the world of
communist states. In a dramatic 'Statement on the Stand of the
Romanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the International
Communist and Working-Class Movement,' adopted by the Party's
Central Committee in April 1964, the Romanian Party called on the
CPSU and the CCP to avoid a split in the world communist movement
and suggested that all the socialist countries should participate in the
CMEA. The Statement also asserted the right of each socialist country to
its own form of development, rejected the supranational functions of
CMEA and stressed the importance of national independence, sover
eignty, and noninterference in the affairs of other states.4
Romania's emphasis on sovereignty and independence is reflected in
its opposition to 'bloc politics,' the 'policy of diktat,' and the continued
domination of the small powers by the big. While Romania remains a
member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), it has substantially
reduced its participation in that organization. The Romanian position on
blocs was made clear by President Ceausescu in a 1966 speech:
military blocs and the existence of military bases and of troops on
the territory of other states are barriers in the path of collaboration
among the peoples. The existence of blocs, as well as the sending of
troops to other countries, is an anachronism inconsistent with the
independence and national sovereignty of peoples and nonnal
relations among states. s
This position has led Romania to call for the abolition of all military
blocs. It should be noted that the official Warsaw Pact position is also for
the 'simultaneous' dismantling of WTO and NATO. The difference
in the Romanian and Soviet WTO view of military blocs is that while
the fOIDler finds fault with the system of blocs and bloc politics, the
latter focuses on NATO as the primary obstacle to cooperation among
states. 6
Romania's emphasis on sovereignty, and its criticism of the military
blocs, has also led it to appeal for a reduction of the use of force in
interstate relations. At the 12th Party Congress in 1979, for example,
Ceausescu called for 'total elimination of the policy offorce and diktat in
international life, the elimination of interference in the domestic affairs
of other states, and the policy of spheres ofinfluence.'7
From the Romanian point of view, of course, the main violators of
these nOIDlS are the big powers. In fact, as the Romanian delegate to the
u.N. Disarmament Committee pointed out, the most damaging trends in
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international affairs are caused, in part, 'by the intensification of the
policy of domination and interference in the internal affairs of other
states [and] the consolidation of spheres of inftuence.'8 The Romanian
Party opposed not only the threat or use of force in international politics,
but also the 'import or export of revolution or counter-revolution.'9
The Romanian criticism of the big powers is most specific in terms of
their military policies. They find the policies of exporting arms,
establishing foreign military bases, and stationing troops in other
countries to be both destabilizing of the international system, and
exploitative of the recipient states. Ion Nicolae, writing in the foreign
affairs weekly Lumea, finds that the deployment of troops and bases on
foreign territories 'causes insecurity, tension, portends war, infringes the
host states' independent policies, and stimulates arms proliferation.'
Nicolae also asserts that:

sized states no longer need 'to play the role of p.
big imperialist powers.'11 Corneliu Bogdan ev
writers as Alastair Buchan and Klaus Knorr on
the small states to defy the big ones.J3
Romania has made a concerted effort to :
smaller powers, particularly in international for
pa tion for such states outside of existing blocs.
and leading role in procedural jockeying for ful
for all states 'outside of military alliances' at thl
and Cooperation in Europe in 1973; at the
mutual force reductions; and at the U.N. Dis;
1979.

The supply of weapons along with the assignment of military
instructors and advisors are assets the military powers use to gain
domineering positions in the importing states' economic and
political life, and tutor these states' foreign policy in conformity
with the suppliers' interests. 10
It should be noted here that these Romanian assertions are different
from similar Soviet ones in that they do not assign blame exclusively to
the Western imperialist powers, as the Soviets do. The Romanians do not
explicitly identify the Soviets as being at fault here, of course, but neither
do they specifically exclude tlIem from the category of ,big power'
Romania has been evenhanded in its criticism of the big powers for
the use of force in international relations. During the Vietnam war,
Ceausescu was harshly critical of American policy. But Romania did not
participate in the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968,
and boldly criticized that action too. More recently Romania, unlike the
other bloc states, refused to express support for the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, and abstained in the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution criticizing the Soviet action. And with the beginning of unrest
in Poland in the summer of 1980, the Romanian Party daily Scinteia
asserted that the problems 'can and must be solved by the Polish
people ... with no outside interference.... The Polish nation has clearly
stated its policy pOinting out that by no means does it wish or want
others to solve its problems.'ll
Romania's appeal for a reduction in the use of force and intimidation
by the big powers ·has been accompanied by an argument for a greater
role in international affairs for small and medium sized powers. Romania
complains about the dominance of the big powers, but also asserts that
the influence of the big states is shrinking and that the small and medium
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sized states no longer need 'to play the role of pawns in the service of the
big imperialist powers.'12 Corneliu Bogdan even quotes such Western
writers as Alastair Buchan and Klaus Knorr on the growing capacity of
the small sta tes to defy the big ones. 13
Romania has made a concerted effort to achieve equal status for
smaller powers, particularly in international forums, and greater partici
pation for such states outside of existing blocs. Romania played a major
and leading role in procedural jockeying for full and equal participation
for all states 'outside of military alliances' at the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe in 1973; at the Vienna negotiations on
mutual force reductions; and at the U.N. Disarmament Committee in
1979.
Instruments of Romanian Policy
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Romania has adopted a number of foreign policy instruments in pursuit
of the goals outlined above. These include reduced participation in and
dependence on the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance, an expansion of diplomatic and trade relations with non
communist countries, increased participation in international organiza
tions and other multilateral forums, and increased emphasis on arms
control and disarmament proposals and activities. While the last of these
is the focus of this paper, the others provide a context for Romanian
arms control policies, and will be reviewed briefly below.
Romania has gradually reduced its involvement in Soviet bloc
activities since the mid-1960s. As noted above, the first major point of
dispute between Romania and the Soviet Union was supranational
economic planning within CMEA. Romania rejected Khrushchev's plan
for the Romanian economy, continued with its own economic plans, and
gradually reduced its trade dependence on its communist allies. By the
1970s, Romania's proportion of trade within CMEA was the smallest of
any member of that organization.
With the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, and Nicolae Ceausescu's accession
to leadership in March 1965, Romania's challenges to the Soviet Union
began to spill into the military sphere and intrude on Romania's position
within the WTO. In the years 1966-1969 Romania initiated unilateral
reductions in its armed forces, reduced the length of compulsory military
service, called for abolition of the military blocs, reduced the size of the
Soviet military mission in Bucharest, criticized the dominant role of the
Soviets in the WTO, refused to participate in joint WTO maneuvers,
and refused to allow such exercises on Romanian soil. 14
Romania has continued these policies affecting its military posture and
its relationship with the WTO, but also began in the middle 1960s to
2
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adopl stances on major foreign policy issues thal were quite independent
of the Soviet and WTO line. In 1967, Romania became the first bloc state
to establish diplomatic relations with Wesl Germany. The same year,
Romania was the only East European state not to sever relations wilh
Israel after the June War. As already nOled, Romania did not participa te
in the Warsaw Pacl intervention in Czechoslovakia, and harsWy
criticized that action.
Romania's independent position in foreign affairs has required it to
become more self-sufficient and autonomous in the military realm. This
point should not be made too much of, since Romania remains a
member of the Warsaw Pact, attends most Pact meetings, and signs and
expresses agreement with most of the documents that issue from that
organization. But within these limits, the Ceausescu leadership has tried
to become bolh less dependent on the Soviet Union for military
protection, and better able to fend off erstwhile allies if it becomes
necessary. This has posed something of a dilemma for the regime, since it
has also persislently called for a reduction of force levels and military
expendilures in Europe, and has tried to set an example in this regard, as
will be discussed below. The result is that Romania has reduced the size
of its regular armed forces and military budget, while at the same time it
has built up its own production of military equipment and developed
local and guerilla defenses for use in the event of an outside attack.
Romania's military spending as a percentage of government spending
and as a percentage of GNP is the smallest of the WTO, and its armed
forces, as a percentage of eligible males, are also the smallest in the
Pact.!5 The country's armed forces declined in size from 1965 to 1979,
and in the last few years the government claims to have made cuts in
defense expenditures as well. One result of this, whether intended or not,
is that the Romanian military has become the least useful to the Soviet
Union, strictly in numerical and technological terms. At the same time,
to relieve itself of total dependence on the Soviet Union, Romania began
production of light arms and military goods in the late 1960s, such that
by 1975, Romania claimed to be producing 60% of the equipment
necessary for its armed forces. There has also been a diversification of the
sources of arms imports and production, with the purchase of American
jet aircraft for military transport, and agreements with the British and
West Germans for the production of transport aircraft, with the French
for Alouette III helicopters and with the Yugoslavs for Orao fighter and
ground attack aircraft. 16
The corollary to all of this is the system of total national defense,
which is modeled on the Yugoslav practice. The origins for this go back
to August 21, 1968, the day of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia,
when Ceausescu announced the formation of an armed patriotic guard
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of some 100,000. The system was formalized in t
which provides for an 'all horizons' defense, loc;
the event of attack, and the decentralization c
wartime.!7 A 1979 'Decree on the Operation
Units in Wartime' provides for decentralized C(
well.ls So, according to The Military Balanl
proportionately the smallest military force (l8(
has even in absolute terms, by far the largest
for~es (737,000; much larger than that of eithe
Union) and the third largest number ofreservisl
Union and Poland. 19
Romania's efforts to dissociate itself from th
WTO have led it to diversify its diplomatic and
the early 1960s, Romania found some room for
the Soviet Union and China, and managed ra
mediating role in that dispute. As it became cl
could be of little help to the Romanians, and
Europe were reduced, Romania began to expo
West. By 1974, almost half of Roman.ia's tra(
countries. By 1975, Romania had achIeved m
with the United States, and there were rumors
.
20
purchase armaments from Western countnes.
an agreement with Canada to purchase the firs
CANDU nuclear reactors.
But by this time, the era of detente had air'
useful to the West, consequently reducing R
itself away from the Soviet bloc by means of th
the middle 1970s, Romania began to associate
the developing and non-aligned countries of thl
1972 Party Conference Romania was fo~ally
nation, and in February 1976, Romarua wa
World's Group of 77. Romania's foreign trade
grew from 4% of the total in 1?60 to ?ver .H
international meetings. Romama has Identlfl
participated in the private meetings of, the non
rather than those of the Warsaw Pact. 2 !
Romania has also gained worldwide visibilit
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of some 100,000. Tlle system was formalized in the Defense Law of 1972,
which provides for an 'all horizons' defense, local and guerilla actions in
the event of attack, and the decentralization of military command in
wartime.J7 A 1979 'Decree on the Operation of Militarized Socialist
Units in Wartime' provides for decentralized control of the economy as
well. 18 So, according to The Military Balance, while Romania has
proportionately the smallest military force (180,000) in East Europe, it
has, even in absolute terms, by far the largest number of paramilitary
forces (737,000; much larger than that of either the GDR or the Soviet
Union) and the third largest num ber of reservists, behind only the Soviet
Union and Poland .19
Romania's efforts to dissociate itself from the Soviet Union and the
WTO have led it to diversify its diplomatic and economic ties as well. In
the early 1960s, Romania found some room for itself in the gap between
the Soviet Union and China, and managed rather effectively to playa
mediating role in that dispute. As it became clear, however, that China
could be of little help to the Romanians, and as Cold War tensions in
Europe were reduced, Romania began to expand its contacts with the
West. By 1974, almost half of Romania's trade was with the Western
countries. By 1975, Romania had achieved most favored nation status
with the United States, and there were rumors that it was attempting to
purchase armaments from Western countries.2° In 1978, Romania signed
an agreement with Canada to purchase the first of several 600 megawatt
CANDU nuclear reactors.
But by this lime, the era of detente had already made Romania less
useful to the West, consequently reducing Romania's ability to lever
itself awa y from the Soviet bloc by means of the Western states. Thus, in
the middle 1970s, Romania began to associate itself more and more with
the developing and non-aligned countries of the Third World. In the July
1972 Party Conference Romania was formally identified as a developing
nation, and in February 1976, Romania was admitted to the Third
World's Group of 77. Romania's foreign trade with developing countries
grew from 4% of the total in 1960 to over 18% in 1976. And in some
international meetings, Romania has identified itself with, and often
participated in the private meetings of, the nonaligned and neutral states
rather than those of the Warsaw Pact. 21
Romania has also gained worldwide visibility by playing an active role
in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Almost every day, the
Romanian media report on bilateral communiques, agreements, or
summits, usually featuring President Ceausescu. Romania has also
committed itself heavily to participation in international meetings,
intergovernmental organizations, and international agreements. In 1972,
Romania became the first eastern bloc member of the International
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Mon~tary

Fund and the World Bank. It has been especially active in
multIlateral forums on arms control and security, including the Helsinki
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its follow up
sessIOns; the Vienna negotiations on mutual force reductions in Europe;
and the various U.N. disarmament foroms.
All of these foreign policy actions have brought Romania closer to its
desired position in the international political arena. Romania has been
able to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact
allies, t.o. make them le.ss dependent on Romania, and to establish greater
recogllltIOn of the regIme as a relatively autonomous state in a divided
Eur.ope. These activities are complemented and enhanced by Romania's
P?SlhOn on ~rms control and disaonament. These policies also may be
vlew~d as lllstruments of Romanian foreign pOlicy, in that they
cont~~ute to the country's long teon and short teon foreign policy goals.
But It IS also apparent that Ceausescu and the Romanian leadership view
an end to the arms race as an important goal in itself.
Romanian Views on the Arms Race and Anns Control
The im portance of disarmament in Romanian foreign policy is evident
from the frequent references to this goal in the speeches of Ceausescu
and other political leaders. The President has said, for example. that
one of the historic missions of socialism and communism, besides
the liberation of peoples from any domination and oppression, is
that of saving mankind from a new war, of achieving disarmament
and, first of all, nuclear disarmament. 22
In the 1960s and early 1970s, Romania's criticisms of the arms race
and appeals for disarmament did not always reflect a detailed under
standing of the dynamics of the arms race and the political and technical
complexities of aons control negotiations. Of late, however, this no
longer seems to be the case, perhaps partially because of Romania's own
participation in disarmament negotiations at the United Nations and in
the Mutual Force Reduction talks in Vienna. Academic studies in
particular increasingly demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of
issues of strategy, proliferation, and arms control. Most of these rely
heavily on the standard Western sources of data, such as SIPRI and nss,
and seem well acquainted with the major Western, particularly Ameri
can, studies in this area. 23
The Romanians see the main cause of the arms race as a structural
on~, resulti~g from tlle existence of competitive military blocs and the
actIOn-reactIOn phenomenon. Unlike the Soviet Union, Romania does
not put the main responsibility on NATO, the United States, and
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'aggressive imperialist circles.' Nicolae Moraru, for example, writes:
The main and fundamental cause underlying the arms race in
post-war Europe resides in the structuring of European security in
the old and noxious policy of the us:e and/or threat of force ... and
in the so-called 'balance of Eurostrategic forces' which entailed a
dynamic and exponential growth in national military potentials.24
Gheorghe Dolgu, similarly non-judgmental about the initiator and
perpetuator of the arms race, identifies five factors that allow it to
continue: technological improvements, leading to an action-reaction
cycle; new military doctrines which envisage the use of nuclear weapons
on the battlefield; the competition for a preemptive strike capability;
socio-economic factors, such as the military-industrial complex; and the
effort to form spheres of domination. 25
Romanian delegates to international meetings are also evenhanded in
assigning blame for the arms race. The Romanian representative to the
U.N. Disarmament Committee, for example, found that the impasse in
international disarmament negotiations was between the 'major nuclear
powers' and the non-nuclear states and not, as the Soviets would have it,
a result of intransigence by the Western states. 26 The Soviets, as might be
expected, are not happy with this kind of approach to the question. In
the same forum, Soviet ambassador Troyanovsky complained about
assertions, 'particularly in this Organization' about 'the equal responsibi
lity of the great powers for the arms race.'27
In discussing the consequences of the arms race, the Party and the
press typically cite the general negative effect on European security and
on the global economy, often citing data from Ruth Sivard's World
Military and Social Expenditures series. In more academic articles, there
is somewhat more elaboration of the specific effects of the arms race on
European and Romanian security. Nicolae Moraru, in the article
mentioned above, identifies several particularly dangerous and destabi
lizing aspects of the arms race: the possibility that nuclear weapons will
be used, thus destroying Europe; the development of weapons of
'limited' collateral destruction and the miniaturization of tactical nuclear
weapons lowering the nuclear threshold; and the increasingly sophisti
cated technology of weapons systems making negotiations more diffi
cul1. 28 Romanian writers have also contended that security in Europe
'does not propose merely the absence of certain conflicts, but presup
poses the establishment of a broad framework of collaboration and
cooperation between all countries.'29 The arms race, it is argued, simply
undermines efforts to build such cooperation.
While many of Romania's early proposals for disarmament were
sweeping and non-compromising, its proposals have recently become
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increasingly specific and detailed. In the United Nations, for example,
while the Soviets often abstain on specific arms control resolutions
because they are too limited or narrow, Romania votes for virtually
every resolution in this area, including some which are meant to be seen
as alternatives to each other. The Romanians emphasize the need for
immediate, concrete, and partial measures, believing that general
disarmament may be some years down the road. As a consequence of
these different approaches to arms control, the Romanian and Soviet
delegations often find themselves voting on opposite sides on U.N.
disarmament resolutions.
In resolutions on arms control that were adopted (and in which there
was a vote) at the 33rd Session of the General Assembly (1978-9),
Romania voted yes on all 22 such resolutions, while the Soviets (and the
other WIO states) abstained or voted against on eleven of them. In the
34th Session the next year, Romania and the Soviet Union voted
together on eleven resolutions and against each other on eight- 30
As is apparent, Romanian views on the arms race and arms control are
quite different from those of the Soviet Union, just as their views on
other foreign policy issues differ. As will be seen in the following section,
these differences are reflected in the specific arms control proposals that
the Romanians have put forward over the years.
Romanian Disarmament and Arms Control Proposals

Like other Warsaw Pact states Romania has long favored a number of
arms control measures, ranging from limitations on troop movements
along borders, to total disarmament and a prohibition of the use of force
in the conduct of interstate relations. Like all such proposals, they are a
mixture of propaganda and serious intent. But it seems from the prom
inence given such proposals by Romanian party officials, diplomats, and
academics, the sheer persistence with which these proposals are advanced,
and the important differences between Romanian and WTO proposals, that
Romania does have a serious interest in arms control.
The Romanians, like the SOViets, have put forward dozens of arms
control and disarmament proposals over the years. In the 1960s,
Romanian proposals largely reflected those of the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact, and therefore tended to be comprehensive. The 1964 Party
Sta tement, for exam pIe, simply expressed support for the Soviet
proposals for ending the production and eventual destruction of nuclear
weapons, the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories, and the
abolition of all armed forces. It also expressed support for the 1960 WTO
appeal for the banning of the testing of nuclear weapons and for the
abolition of military blocs.
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In recent years, Romanian arms control proposals have been advanced
on their own merits, usually without reference to similar WTO or Soviet
proposals. Many of the Romanian and WTO proposals are the same, or
similar, but some are quite different. There are also differences in the
emphasis that the Romanians or the Soviets give to various proposals.
The main independent proposals emphasized by the Romanians in
recent years are for the reduction of military budgets, and the
establishment of demilitarized zones along national borders. They Ilave
also appealed for the elimination of military blocs and foreign military
bases, and for regional nuclear free zones, though these proposals are
similar to WTO pronouncements.
The Reduction of Military Budgets

One of Romania's most frequently and insistently voiced demands in
recent years has been for the freezing and subsequent reductIon of
military budgets. These appeals have been especially insistent since tIle
1978 decisions by NATO and the WTO to increase defense spending, but
the Romanian proposals in this regard predate those decisions. In 1970,
Romania proposed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
(the recently enlarged Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee) a
series of disarmament measures, including a proposal for the early
freeZing and subsequent reduction of the military budgets of all states. 31
Romania put forward a similar proposal at the Helsinki preparatory
talks for the CSCE in 1973.
The proposal became a major one for the Romanians, and an
important and divisive issue between Moscow and Bucharest at the
meeting of the WTO Heads of State in Moscow in November 1978. The
NATO Council had just adopted a decision to increase military
appropriations by each of the member states, and Moscow was calling
for increased defense spending and tighter military integration in the
Warsaw Pact. 32 Ceausescu refused to go along with these plans, and on
his return to Romania stated that 'we have undertaken no commitment
and do not intend to increase our military expenditures.' He expressed
disapproval of the May NATO decision, but also asserted tIlat the
socialist countries 'should say a resolute "no" to the arms race' and
should 'reduce military expenditures, which are a heavy burden on all
the peoples, including the socialist peoples.'33 Ceausescu went on to state
the Romanian position on the reduction of military budgets, which has
remained the formula since that time:
The starting point should be a freeze on military expenditures,
troops, and armaments at the level of 1978, which should then be
gradually cut back at a first stage by at least 10-15 per cent by
1985.34
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Ceausescu argued that alllhis was necessary both to reduce international
tensions and to help end the arms race, and that it was possible because
the danger of war or military action was not imminent.35
The Soviet reaction to all of this has been ambivalent. The Russians
seem initially to have followed the Romanian lead on the reduction of
military budgets. In 1973, three years after the first Romanian proposal,
the Soviets introd uced into the General Assembly a resolution calling for
a 10% reduction in military expenditures by each of the permanent
members of the Security Council, and the allocation of part of the
released funds for development assistance. 36
. ~ntil 1978, then, the Soviet and Romanian positions were quite
sunilar. But when Ceausescu refused to go along with the wro budget
increases, Brezhnev criticized those whose 'demagogic arguments' could
lead to 'the weakening of our defenses in the face of the growing military
might of imperialism. '37 Nevertheless, perhaps partially as a compromise
to the Romanians, the WTO Communique of November 1978 included a
proposal for the reduction of military budgets 'whether by equal parts,
percentage, or in absolute terms' and this formula has been repeated in
subsequent Pact Communiques and in Soviet proposals to the United
Nations. But the Soviet Union and all the wro states except Romania
voted against a U.N. General Assembly Resolution adopted in 1978
which provided for a standard international system of measuring and
reporting military budgets, and declined to participate in the test of the
system in 1979. 38
The basic Romanian proposals on military budgets have continued to
be pressed, both in speeches and in multilateral forums, though there
have been some elaborations on the theme. At the U.N. Commission on
Disarmament in May 1979, the 10-15% formula was repeated, but 'with
considerably bigger reductions for the heavily armed countries.'39 And in
November 1980, at the U.N. Disarmament Committee, the Romanians
put forward the proposition that the nuclear states and those most
heavily armed should be the first to engage in the process of freezing and
reducing military budgets. 4o
In following its own prescriptions Romania claims to have effected
major reductions in its own military budget in each of the last three
years - by some 500 million lei (about 4% of the defense budget) in 1979
and by nearly 2 billion lei (16%) in 1980.41 In 1979, the savings were
diverted to increasing state allowances for childreI).. And in the U.N.,
~CT AD and ot?er forums, Romania has no doubt won favor among
ItS Third World fnends by proposing a Common Development Fund, to
?e furnished by developed countries' contributions from military spend
mg, to be used primarily for developing countries with annual per capita
GNPs of less than $600. 42
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Confidence Building Measures and Restrictions on Military Maneuvers
While most Romanian arms control proposals are similar to Soviet or
wro initiatives, on the topic of military maneuvers Romania's sugges
tions are quite different from anything proposed by its allies, and are not
mentioned or reflected in WTO documents. Romania's interest in
military movements and maneuvers has been evident ever since August
1968. The Romanian delegates at the Helsinki CSCE Conference were
particularly interested in the CBM (Confidence Building Measures) in
the final document, which provided for prior notification of any military
maneuvers of over 25,000 troops within 250 kilometers of national
frontiers. 43 Romania has also been very active in the military exchanges
encouraged by the Helsinki agreements. In the exchange of senior
defense officials between the U.S. and the wro countries between 1975
and 1979, Romania has had eight such exchanges compared to six for the
Soviet Union and one for Hungary.44 At the CSCE followup meeting in
Madrid in December 1980, Romania proposed a Conference on
Confidence Building and Disarmament in Europe. 4S
There are two unique proposalS in this area put forward by the
Romanians in recent years: one for a cessation of military maneuvers
near national borders; and another for a demilitarized zone between
NATO and the WYO. Romania has periodically suggested tlJat military
maneuvers in Europe be ended altogether. This was an element in the
Romanian position at both the Helsinki preparatory conference in 1973
and at the Geneva Disarmament Committee in 1979. Their somewhat
more realistic proposal for the ending of military maneuvers on the
borders of other states was first enunciated at the time of the Soviet inter
vention in Czechoslovakia but was not systematically developed until the
late I 970s. At the CSCE Review Conference in Belgrade in 1977-8, the
Romanian proposals included a cessation of multinational maneuvers near
the frontiers of participating states.46 In Ceausescu's December 1978 speech,
after the Warsaw Pact meeting calling for closer integration and higher
military expenditures, he called for reducing and halting military man
euvers 'and generally all displays of force, in the neighborhood of the
national borders of other States.'47 Then in 1979, the following proposal was
advanced at the UN. Special Session on Disarmament:
a shutdown of military bases in the border area and creation of
15-20 kilometer wide security belts from the borderline where
neither troops nor weapons should ever station. 48
The other major proposal in this area is for a demilitarized strip
between the two blocs. This was first suggested by Ceausescu in his
December 1978 speech, as follows:
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It would perhaps be useful to establish a strip between the two
blocs, stretching on each side, free of all troops and weapons, and
from which all maneuvers and military displays would be
banned. 49
In February of 1979, Ceausescu elaborated on this proposal, suggesting
that the buffer zone should be 80-100 kilometers wide and that only a
small national force on each side should be located there. This proposal
was put to the Geneva Disarmament Committee that same month. 5o
Both of these sets of proposals are very different from, and much more
thoroughgoing than, anything the Soviets have proposed in recent years.
The Soviet and Warsaw Pact proposals have been much more limited,
for example, to earlier prior notification of land maneuvers, limitation of
maneuvers to 50,000 men, and extension of CBM to naval and aerial
maneuvers, and to the Mediterranean. 51 The Romanian proposals,
understandably, have not even been mentioned by the Soviet Union or
the other members of the Warsaw Pact. They pertain, of course, to an
area of utmost sensitivity to Soviet ci.::fense planners, and the implemen
tation of such measures would severely restrict the intimidating kind of
maneuvers practiced in and around Czechoslovakia before their inter
vention there, and on the borders with Poland more recently. This, of
course, may be precisely why the Romanians have proposed them.
Dissolving the Military Blocs
Romania has, since the 1964 Party Statement, persistently called for the
abolition of all military blocs though, in most respects, its appeals here
have followed very closely those of the Soviet Union and the WTO. In
fact, the Warsaw Treaty itself, signed in 1955 in response to the
integration of West Germany into NATO, states that the Organization
will be dissolved as soon as NATO is. The appeal for the dissolution of
the blocs has been renewed periodically by the WTO. In 1966, the
organization proposed the 'simultaneous' dissolution of existing military
alliances or, as a first step, the abolition of the military organizations
within the alliances. This formula was disaggregated and made even less
demanding in 1978, when the WTO called for dissolution of the military
organizations 'starting with a mutual reduction of military activity.'52
Ceausescu repeated this formula in a speech just one month after the
Pact meeting. 53
Despite the apparent consonance of views on the dissolution of the
military blocs between Romania and the Soviet Union, there are some
important differences in both emphasis and motive. As noted above, the
Romanians have different views from the Soviets on the role of the blocs
in international affairs, with the former assigning both blocs responsibility
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for international tensions and the arms race, and the latter vigorously
asserting the differential effects and purposes of the two alliances.
Ceausescu's support for pact dissolutions has been more consistent and
more insistent than that of his WTO allies. He has appealed for 'intense
activities to reduce the activities of the military pacts' and 'specifiC
measures aimed at the simultaneous dismantling of those pacts.' He has
asserted that 'peace can be served not by intensifying the arms race and
strengthening the military blocs, but by cutting down and dismantling
the military blocs.'5Q This evenhanded criticism of the blocs wa~ probably
not what the Soviets had in mind.
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In terms of continuity and consistency, the Romanian proposals are
also different from the Soviets'. While the Soviets and the WTO have for
a long time advocated the abolition of foreign bases and the withdrawal
of foreign troops, these have not always been prominent in the lexicon of
Soviet disarmament proposals. While the July 1966 WTO Communique
called attention to military bases, these proposals gradually disappeared
as negotiations for the Helsinki conference got under way. During the
late 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet and Pact statements simply called for
reductions of armed forces in Europe. Not until the November 1978
WTO meeting was the formula on military bases and foreign troops
revived. it was repeated in both the 1979 and 1980 WTO Communiques,
although it was not among the list of proposals made by Brezhnev at the
26th Party Congress in February 1981.
For the Romanians, on the other hand, proposals for eliminating
foreign military bases, or withdrawing foreign troops, or both have been
voiced continuously since at least the 1964 Party Statement, in official
speeches and before the U.N. and the CSCE. In 1971, a new twist was
added in a Romania- Yugoslav j oint communique, in which a call for tlIe
banning of new military bases and new nuclear weapons on foreign
territory was added to the old formula. 6o In his December 1978 speech,
Ceausescu included all these elements plus asking for a pledge from
other states not to accept foreign military bases. His formula, as follows,
is essentially the one that has been pursued by Romania since then:
Equally important would be pledges not to station more troops and
weapons on the territory of other States, and to begin gradually to
reduce and then withdraw all foreign troops to within their own
national borders, as well as to dismantle military bases, primarily
nuclear ones, from the territory of other states; and pledges by all
the States not to permit foreign bases on their territory .. .61
Again we see that the Romanian formula is much more specific than the
WTO's rather cursory mention of 'the dismantling of foreign military
bases and the withdrawal of troops from other peoples' territories.'62 The
Romanian proposal is both more serious and more practical, in that is
contains intermediate steps and gradual measures for achieving the final
goal.
Nuclear free zones

Another proposal that is commonly associated with the Romanians is for
the creation of a nuclear free zone in the Balkans. In fact, this has not
been one of the major Romanian interests in recent years, and current
Romanian ideas on this are similar to those of the Soviets. The first
proposal of this nature was made by Romanian Prime Minister Stoica in
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September of 1957, when he suggested a conference to convert the
Balkans into a 'peace zone'. But he did not at that time explicitly
mention nuclear weapons. 63 This issue was tirst raised on June 6, 1959,
several days after Soviet Premier Khrushchev, during a visit to Albania,
proposed creating a zone 'free from missiles and atomic weapons' in the
Balkans and part of the Adriatic region. This proposal was formally
conveyed by the Soviet government to six Western governments on June
25, but they eventually rejected it. In 1963, the Soviets revived the
initiative for a denuclearized zone in the Mediterranean. But the United
States was then replacing its missile bases in Greece and Turkey with
Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, and rejected this proposal as
well. 64
After this point, the idea of a Balkan nuclear free zone was never a
major element in the Romanian, or Warsaw Pact, arms control packages.
The Romanian Party Statement of 1964 did call for denuclearized zones
in a number of regions, including the Balkans. But the idea of a
specifically Balkan zone was never supported in official WTO state
ments6j and the Romanian proposal gradually came to reflect the more
general Pact policy for nuclear free zones 'in various areas, including
Europe.'66 In recent speeches on arms control, Ceausescu has not
mentioned nuclear free zones at all.
The Romanian retreat on this issue may be due in part to the failure of
the Khrushchev initiatives and of the Rapacki Plan of 1958 and the
Gomulka Plan of 1964 for nuclear free zones in Central Europe. But
there may also have been the feeling that the nuclear free zone plan was
redundant alongside other Romanian proposals for eliminating foreign
military bases, especially nuclear ones, for pledges by nuclear states not
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear ones, and for no new nuclear
weapons to be introduced in Europe.
Other Arms Control Issues

The issues discussed so far are all arms control proposalS which have not
yet been implemented. There has also been some disagreement between
the Soviet Union and Romania on arms control agreements that have
been reached, especially the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and
the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Romanians have been noticeably quiescent on the issue of nuclear
weapons testing, probably because of their reluctance to take sides on an
issue that divides the Soviet Union and China. The PRC has not signed
the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, and this has been a source of irritation to
Moscow. While the Romanian Communist Party did mention the
banning of the testing of nuclear weapons in its 1964 Statement, it has
not done so since. The Romanians have refrained from supporting the
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Soviet proposals for a complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests and,
more recently, for a one year moratorium on such testing 6 ?, presumably
also In deference to China.
On the No~-Proliferati.on Treat~ (NPT), Romania has been skeptical
from the begmmng, feehng that It was biased in favor of the nuclear
powers. In a major speech on foreign policy in 1967, Ceausescu
expressed reservations with non-proliferation that many non-nuclear
powers shared:
Without preci.se, firm, and efficient measures on the part of all
states f~r ceasIn? t~e p~oduction of nuclear weapons, for reducing
and ultImately hqUldatmg the existing stockpiles, nonproliferation
would not only fail to secure progress along the way of liquidating
the danger of nuclear war, but would bring about its indefinite
perpetuation. 68
Ceausescu also wanted assurances that the NPT would allow unres
access to nuclear energy and that the non-nuclear states would get
secunty guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against
them or used to menace them.
Romania'.s unhappiness with the eventual treaty was such that it
refused to sign a WTO Declaration endorsing the Treaty, the first time
that a ~O .document was not unanimously accepted. 69 And Romania
delayed slgrung the Treaty until February of 1970. Since that time
~omania has complained that the nuclear powers have not kept thei;
sIde of the deal, have contmued vertical proliferation, and have
obstru~ted the transfer of peaceful nuclear energy to non-nuclear
countnes, partIcularly developing countries'?o One can infer that these
last cha.rges are aimed particularly at the Soviet Union, especially since
Romama has recently contracted with Canada to purchase nuclear
reactors.?1
tricte~

Romania's Long Term Foreign Policy Goals and Arms Control
Roma~a:s a~s cont~ol

policies have been an important tool of
Romama s foreIgn pohcy. They have helped Romania achieve some
autonomy within the Soviet bloc, and have contributed to each of the
four major elements of Romania's vision of a desirable world order:
sovereignty an.d. independence for all states, a reduction of the impor
tance of the military blocs, a decline in the use or threat of force, and an
enhanced role for small states in international politics.
Romania's emphasis on sovereignty, independence, and the impor
tance of the natlOnal state has been supported by its arms control
proposals and policies in two important ways. First of all, manY' of the
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country's arms control proposals are aimed at trying to preserve the
territorial integrity of states. The arguments against military blocs,
foreign military bases and troops, and the proposals for demilitarized
zones are all aimed at restoring the sovereignty of European states,
particularly the weaker ones. Second, the very nature of Romania's
maverick position on arms control issues fortifies its own independence
in foreign and military poliCY, and acts as an example to other states.
Romania's rejection of supranational coordination of military maneuvers
and military spending is also a demonstration and affirmation of its own
independence and sovereignty.
Ceausescu's opposition to 'bloc pOlitics' and the domination of the big
powers has also been supported by his arms control and military policies.
Most importantly, of course, Romania has removed itself from full
participation in its own bloc by refusing to participate in WTO
maneuvers or allow such maneuvers on Romanian soil; by refusing to go
along with several WTO initiatives (such as the NPT, initially, and
increases in military spending); and by abstaining from major WTO
actions such as the intervention in Czechoslovakia.
Romania has expressed its differences with the Soviet Union On the
purposes and usefulness of military blocs and has insistently advocated
their abolition. Most importantly, perhaps, Romania differs from its
allies on the need to strengthen the military component of the Warsaw
Pact. While the rest of the Pact has increased military spending and
capabilities, Romania has cut back in these areas, and has called upon its
allies to do likewise. Romania has built up its civilian defense force
(which is modeled on that of the Yugoslavs), which is useful only for
defensive operations against an enemy invading Romanian territory. Il
has cut back, at the same time, on the very forces that would be most
useful for the rapid, mobile, and offensive actions the Soviets envisage in
a European conflict. Romania has then, by both word and deed.
removed itself from the arena of East-West conflict.
Most of these policies also support Romania's position on the
elimination of the use of force in international politics. Romania is
particularly concerned about the possible use of nuclear weapons in
Europe, and sees in their use the probable destruction of the continent.
Romanian commentators also contend that a major conflict in Europe is
likely to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, Romania believes,
the European states should try to avoid stepping on to even that first
rung of the conflict ladder, and must avoid altogether the use of force in
their relations.
In line with this, Romania has argued for efforts to reduce both the
means of conflict, and the occasions that might lead to conflict.
Romania's proposals for reduction in military budgets, conventional
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armaments, military bases, and nuclear weapons support the former, and
the proposals for nuclear free zones, demilitarized borders, and increased
reliance on diplomacy support the latter.
The commitment to diplomacy is also evident from Romania's record
on arms control deliberations, which demonstrate that it is committed as
much to the process of arms control negotiations as it is to the outcome.
In Romania's view, the primary drawback of the arms race is that it
i?creases .tension ~nd reduces the possibility for international coopera
tIon, particularly III Europe. Thus, Romania often emphasizes limited
measures in arms control, rather than the grandiose schemes often put
forward by the Soviet Union. While the outcomes from such limited
accords might not be as dramatic, they can develop some measure of
trust and lead to further negotiations. Romania has expressed support
for the SALT Treaty, and for Brezhnev's October 1979 initiatives in this
kind of language. Romania's commitment to, and involvem'ent in,
multilateral forums on arms control, is also a measure of its interest in
the process of arms control negotiations. The Romanian leaders clearly
hope tha t negotiations on arms, and the conclusion of a network of arms
control agreements, will reduce the incentive of states to rely on force in
their international behavior.
Romania's argument for a more visible role for small states in the
international arena has been supported in three ways by its arms control
policies. ~irst, Romania has increased its own autonomy by demonstrating,
m a public and visible fashion, its distance from the Soviet Union on some
a~s control issues. It should be emphasized here that Romania's policies in
thIS area are not so much defiant as simply autonomous. Romania has, in
fact, supported most of the major Soviet initiatives in arms controL and has
~ttached its signature to all of the Warsaw Pact communiques on these
ISsues. The only Soviet initiative that the Romanians have not supported for
political reasons is the comprehensive test ban.
On the other hand, Romania has not simply toed the Soviet line on
arms control issues. Some Romanian proposals, most especially those on
demilitarized zones on the borders of states and between the two blocs,
have been totally independent of the Soviet line. Others have been
similar to Soviet or WTO proposals, but have differed in the details or
the emphasis given the proposal. There have also been substantial
differences in the context within which the Romanians and the Soviets
place .various arms control initiatives. The Soviets are much more likely
to aSSIgn the blame for the arms race to the United States and NATO.
Romania, in refusing to be so specific, by implication also faults the
Soviet Union.
There are two further ways by which Romania's arms control policies
have enhanced the role of small states. By the sheer persistence with
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~er ways by which Romania's arms control policies
'ole of small states. By the sheer persistence with
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which Ceausescu has pursued anns control issues, he has given Romania
an active, visible and exemplary role as a small state in the international
arena. And in many of these international forums Romania has tried to
enhance the role of all small states by arguing for universal and equal
participation by all states on important anns control and security issues.
Romania's use of arms control as an instrument of foreign policy has
implications for other states as well. Weak states can affect the behavior
of the Powers, by hammering away at policies which the Powers claim to
pursue. This may even affect the policies of the Powers. While it does
seem that in most cases the Soviets have simply let the Romanians go
their own way, the prospect of a dissenter within the Warsaw Pact on a
major arms control initiative must surely temper Soviet proposals. And,
indeed, it does appear that many of the Warsaw Pact statements on arms
control have touched on issues or included wording likely to please the
Romanians, suggesting some measure of bargaining and compromise
within the organization.
The relationship between Romania and the Soviet Union is similar in
some respects to that between the United States and its NATO allies,
particularly on anns control issues. Just as Romania has pressed harder
on some anns limitations measures than the Soviets have, and has been
reluctant to join the chorus denouncing the other side, some of the West
European states have been reluctant partners within NATO. The recent
NATO decision to emplace Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, for
example, was paired with a commitment to negotiation on theater anns
limitations, largely at European insistence. Belgium and the Netherlands
have even delayed their decision on accepting these missiles, pending
evidence of progress on theater anns control.
Historically, the Romanian position within WTO most resembles the
French wi thin NATO. France withdrew from military participation in
NATO in 1966, and closed down NATO bases. Romania took similar
action with respect to the wro in the same period. In fact, Romania
may be deliberately patterning its behavior on the French, particularly
on fonner President de Gaulle. Ceausescu's interest in all-European
cooperation and his enthusiasm for the nation-state, is similar to de
Gaulle's. Romania's 'all horizons' defense law of 1972 recalls France's
'taus azimuts' defense plan adopted in the late 1960s when France was
disengaging from NATO. And after Romania's disagreement with its
Pact allies on military spending in December 1978, a Scinteia editorial
pointedly and approvingly mentioned de Gaulle's 1966 decision on
NATO.n

So just as the European allies of the United States have often
tempered American policies, and required a somewhat less dogmatic
view of communism and the Soviet Union, Romania may help to temper
3
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Soviet proposals. To the extent that these efforts by small states to
promote arms control are successful, even more benefits rebound to
them. The Europeans are, after all, the ones who have the most to lose in
the event of another major war. Romania has emphasized this time and
again. In an era in which superpowers are about to remilitarize, the best
hope of peace may rest with the weak but sensible states.
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